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than to smallholders,
although the impact of credit
is  greater for the smaliholders.
Targeting credit to
smallholders  would  make
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cost-effective.  To reach poor
farmers and farmers  without
assets-in other  words,  to
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Summary findings
Both formal and informal loans matter in agriculture. But  which takes into account the endogeneity of borrowing.
formal lenders provide much more in production lending  Clearly, formal lenders are biased toward larger
than do informal lenders, often at a higher cost than  farmers with collateral. Large landowners, who tend to
what  they can recove.  The Agricultural Development  represent only 4 percent of rural households, get 42
Bank of Pakistan (ADBP),  for example, providing about  percent  of formal loans. Landless and subsistence
90 percent of formal loans in rural areas, incurs high  farmers, who represent more than 69 percent of rural
costs on loan defaults. Like other governments, the  households, receive only 23 percent of formal loans.
Government of Pakistan subsidized the formal scheme on  ADBP loans improve household welfare but, although
the grounds that lending to agriculture is a high-risk  large farmers receive most of thle ADBP finance, the
activity because of covariate risk.  impact of credit is greater for small farmers than for
Because fartm  credit schemes are subsidized,  large farmers. Large landowners use formal loans
policymakers must know if these schemes are worth  unproductively.
supporting. Using recent data from a large household  Because the ADBP scheme is stubsidized,  it is not cost-
survey from rural Pakistan, Khandker and Faruqee  effective for delivering rural credit. It would be more
estimate the cost-effectiveness of the ADBP loans. To  cost effective if small farmers were better targeted
estimate credit's impact, they use a two-stage method,  instead.
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1. Introduction
Credit plays an important role in development. It capitalizes farmers and entrepreneurs
to undertake new investments or adopt new technologies.  It helps smooth consumption by
providing working capital and reduces poverty in the process. Both formal and informal lenders
are active in rural credit market (Adams and Fitchett 1992; Aleem 1990; Ghate 1992; flussain
and Demaine 1992; Udry 1990). Collateral-free lending, proximity, timely delivery, and
flexibility in loan transactions are some of the attractive features of informal credit.'  Unlike
formal finance, informal finance may not be as conducive to development because: (i) it is
expensive, 2 (ii) it is short-term and largely used for consumption, and (iii) it is not large enough
to spur investment and growth.
Notwithstanding the limitations of informnal  finance, many governments have attempted
in the past to develop alternative financial institutions to provide credit to farmers and other rural
producers. Many such attempts have failed not only in delivering credit to target households but
also in promoting a viable credit delivery system.  High covariate risk of agricultural production
(Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986), the asymmetric information and lack of enforcement of loan
contracts (Hoff and Stiglitz 1990)3,  government imprudent interference in credit markets, and
rent-seeking as a result of credit rationing (Braverman and Guasch 1989) are some of the factors
alleged for the poor performance of the government-directed credit schemes in many countries.
With the dismal picture of state-owned rural finance organizations, micro-finance non-
governmental institutions are growing to meet the credit needs of small producers in many
countries.  Reports indicate that they now meet the credit demand of 8-10 million people in
1 Although  the nominal  rate of interest  is lower  for a formal  loan  than for an informal  loan,  the transaction
costs  of borrowing  are higher  for formal  loans  than for informal  loans. However,  unlike  formal  loans,
informal  loans  have  small  transaction  costs,  which  reflect  the opportunity  cost of funding  and  are
independent  of collateral,  duration,  and size of loans.  Informal  lenders  also perform  an important  role
by facilitating  the marketing  of products  or purchasing  inputs,  such as fertilizer. The informal  loans
are often  in kind  and purpose-specific,  and,  hence, serve  some  clientele  need better.
2 Some  studies,  however,  questioned  the excessive  interest  rates  of informal  lenders  (e.g.,  Hussain  and
Demaine  1992).
3 To reduce  the moral  hazard problem  and associated  transaction  cost of lending,  financial  institutions  often
ask  for physical  collateral.  Collateral  restrictions  exclude  the poor  who do not have  assets,  such  as
land,  to offer as collateral  but are otherwise  good  credit  risk.
2Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 4 Many of these organizations are subsidized not for high loan
default costs but for higher transaction costs associated with group-based lending and other
social intermediation costs (Khandker 1998). If agricultural credit schemes are to be supported,
policymakers must know how much they are subsidized, who receives this subsidy, and whether
it helps the borrowers.
Assessing cost-effectiveness of a program means evaluating both its costs and benefits.
Assessing the costs of lending involves the imputed market cost of subsidy these schemes receive
from govemments and donors. Assessing benefits is often problematic because funds are
fungible and because it is not clear if measured credit effect reflects the borrowing constraint or
the unobservable characteristics of a borrower. The presence of bias caused by self-selection of
borrowers into programs may bias assessment of benefits by as large as 100% of actual impacts.5
Nonetheless, there are a number of studies that have successfully estimated program benefits
(Binswanger and Khandker 1995; Carter 1988; Carter and Weibe 1990; Feder and others  1990;
Pitt and Khandker 1996). Binswanger and Khandker (1995) estimate the impact of formal credit
using district-level data from India and find that formal credit increases rural income and
productivity and that rural benefits exceed the cost of the formal system by at least 13 percent.
Feder and others (1990) estimate a switching regression model for households in China, and
distinguish between households that are credit-constrained and those that are not.
Pitt and Khandker (1998) examine the impact of credit from the Grameen Bank and other
targeted credit programs in Bangladesh on a variety of individual and household outcomes,
including enrollment, labor supply, asset holding, fertility and contraceptive use.  They find
credit to be a significant determinant of many household outcomes, and that program credit has a
significant effect on the well-being of poor households in Bangladesh.  Khandker (1998)
observes that micro-credit programs are as cost-effective as other programs, such as the Food for
Work, in benefiting the poor.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the role of the agricultural development Bank of
Pakistan (ADBP) in rural areas and assess its cost-effectiveness in delivering farm credit.  The
paper's contribution lies in adding to the existing literature on the cost-effectiveness of a
govemment-supported farm credit program, which has not been managed well over many years.
The data used in this paper's  analysis is drawn from the rural financial market studies (RFMS)
4For  a discussion  of a broad  range of programs,  see Otero and  Rhyne  (1994),  Christen,  Rhyne  and Vogel
(1994),  Brugger  and  Rajpatirana  (1995)  and Hulme  and Mosley  (1996).
5 See McKeman  (1996).
3from Pakistan.  Results suggest that the effect of ADBP finance is substantial, and that the impact
is higher for small holders than for medium and large holders in agriculture.  Given the
distribution of loans and loan recovery rates, the ADBP is not a cost-effective scheme. The
scheme can be made cost-effective by supporting small holders more than medium and large
holders, improving both loan recovery and administrative efficiency, and making operations
liable to a lending portfolio. 6
The paper is organized as follows.  Section two describes the rural credit market of
Pakistan.  A number of studies including recent data show that market share of institutional
credit is low despite government intervention since 1960. Also formal credit has failed to reach
the borrowers who may have more productive use of credit.  Section three explains the
econometric models used to asses the credit impacts on different household outcomes.  Section
four discusses the regression results.  Based on the two-stage estimation techniques, formal credit
has been found to have significant positive impacts on most household outcomes considered in
this paper.  Section five shows how much costs are involved for ADBP in providing credit.
Section six presents the cost-benefit analysis of the ADBP. The concluding section summarizes
the findings and discusses policy options.
2. The role of Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (ADBP)
Pakistan's rural credit markets, as in other developing countries, are characterized by the
co-existence of formal, semi-formal, and informal lenders. Agricultural Development Bank of
Pakistan (ADBP) dominates the formal institutions.  Informal lenders include a wide variety of
lenders in the villages and surrounding areas, including friends and relatives.  Semi-formal
institutions are NGOs and other micro-finance institutions.  Both formal and semi-formal
financial institutions cover a very small share of rural credit markets (Aleem 1990; Ghate 1992).'
The 1985 rural credit survey indicates that only 10 percent of rural borrowing households
borrowed from formal sources and a very negligible percentage (less than I percent) borrowed
from semi-formal sources (Qureshi, Nabi, and Faruqee 1996). As the size of an average formal
loan is bigger than that of an informal loan, formal credit accounted for 32 percent of total
6 By  providing  more  loans  to smallholders  may  increase  transaction  costs  but it would  also  reduce  high  loan
default  costs for  making  more loans  to large  holders  because  the loan  recovery  rates are higher  for
smallholders  than for large  holders  in agriculture.
7 For general  reference  see Adams  and Fitchett  (1992),  Hoff  and Stiglitz  (1990),  World  Bank (1993).
4volume of loans outstanding.  More re6dent  survey data of the Rural Financial Market Studies
(RFMS), which was administered in 1995 all over Pakistan, shows even a smaller share of
institutional credit.9 Of the 4,380 rural households surveyed, about 59 percent (i.e., 2,581
households) reported having taken some kind of loan, of which only 7 percent (i.e., 180
households) took loans from institutional sources (Table 1). Because of larger loan size, formal
credit accounted for 22 percent of total amount of loans (table 2).
The ADBP has been the dominant source of institutional credit, while "friends and
relatives" are the largest source of non-institutional credit.  The ADBP accounted for 55 percent
of formal loans in 1985 followed by commercial banks (29 percent) and cooperatives (15
percent).  It provided 86 percent of total loans followed by government (5 percent), NGOs (4
percent), commercial banks (3 percent), and cooperatives (2 percent) in 1995 (Table 2).  Friends
and relatives, who do not charge any interest, provided 67 percent of informal loans in 1985
compared to 57 percent in 1995. The share of informal lenders, who charge an interest, has
increased from 33 percent in 1985 to 45 percent in 1995 (table 2).  Out of 43 percent interest-
bearing informal loans in 1995, landlords accounted for 13 percent followed by shopkeepers (7
percent), arthi  and input dealers (each by 6 percent), and a host of others suppliers of informal
loans (11 percent together) (Table 2).
Formal credit explains one-third of rural credit and accounts for not more than 5 percent
of agricultural GDP (Qureshi, Nabi, and Faruqee 1996).'°  Even this small share is increasingly
unsustainable because of subsidy dependence of the ADBP. The ADBP's subsidy accounts for
30 percent of its loan outstanding with a loan default cost as much as 60 percent. Commercial
banks are reluctant to lend in rural areas; while rural deposit accounts for more than 30 percent
of its total deposit, commercial banks do not have more than 5 percent of their loan portfolio in
rural areas.  The situation has not improved since 1985. The market-based credit transactions
include the transactions of the commercial banks, NGOs, moneylenders, input and output
dealers, and other informal lenders. These lenders together do not account for more than 50
8Later surveys  indicated  a similar  coverage  of the institutional  loans. According  to 1990  agriculture
census,  formal  credit  accounted  for 38 percent  of all outstanding  loans of rural  households. The
International  Food  Policy  Research  Institute  (IFPRI)  study  conducted  in 1990  shows  that institutional
credit  accounted  for 32 percent  of rural  credit in Pakistan  (von  Braun,  Malik,  and Zeller 1993).
9For discussion  of the RFMS,  see the appendix.
'0  The rural  production  in Pakistan  is largely  self-financed.  The IFPRI  household  study  showed  that credit
met only  17  percent of the production  expenditures  of rural  households  (von  Braun,  Malik,  and  Zeller
1993).  Since  formal  credit  accounted  for only  32 percent  of rural  credit,  it accounted  for only  5
percent  of the production  expenditure.
5percent of the loan transactions taking place in rural Pakistan.  More importantly, about 70
percent of this market source of credit comes from highly segmented informal credit markets,
where transactions are often a result of personal contacts.
The dominance of informal finance with a lack of market-based rural finance has
negative  implications for rural growth and welfare.  To illustrate this point, consider the purpose
and duration of informal loans vis-a-vis formal loans.  Data shows that formal credit is meant for
production and investment, while informal credit is for consumption. In 1985, 94 percent of
institutional credit was for agricultural production and investment, while only 53 percent of non-
institutional credit were for production.  Moreover, informal loan is largely short-term (90
percent), while formal loan is medium- and long-term (68 percent).  According to the [995
survey, only 5 percent of formal loan, compared with 56 percent of infornal  loan, went to meet
consumption needs (Table 3). Informal loans are mostly (93 percent) for a duration of less than a
year, while formal loans are largely (65 percent) for more than a year.  Formal credit used for
production is used primarily for agriculture production (88 percent) followed by rural non-farm
activities (7 percent).  Of informal loans used for production, agriculture accounted for 27
percent and non-agriculture accounted for 18 percent.  In an economy dependent too much on
informal finance, which is largely used for consumption smoothing, rural growth, which requires
long-term productive investment, is likely to be hampered.
Despite its limited role, past studies have clearly highlighted the importance of
institutional credit in Pakistan (Zuberi 1989; Malik and others 1991). Zuberi (1989) finds that 70
percent of total institutional credit is used for the purchase of seed and fertilizer, and concludes
that most of the increases in agricultural output can be explained by changes in the amount of
seed and fertilizer expenditure.  Malik and others (1991) attempt to provide evidence for the role
of institutional credit in agricultural production.  They use a two-stage structure where the
probability of taking an institutional loan is predicted in the first stage and the predicted value is
used in the second stage to estimate the impact of fertilizer use per acre." 1 Like Zuberi's study
(1989), their results show that institutional credit is an important determinant of fertilizer and
seed expenditure. The study of von Braun, Malik and Zeller (1993) shows that farmers having
access to credit have 37 percent higher input expenditures than those who do not have access to
credit.
Malik  and others  (1991)  used variables  such as household  attitude  toward  interest-bearing  loan  and
village  credit  measuring  the total  institutional  credit  obtained  by the households  in the village  other
than  the household  in the observation.  The latter  instrument  measures  the impact  of infrastructure  and
other  village  variables  on the demand  for credit.
6The impact of credit may vary by the distribution of loans by the wealth of a borrower.
In 1985, only I percent of the formal credit accrued to the poorest households, as compared to 60
percent accrued to the richest households.  In 1995, about 2 percent of formal credit were
accrued to the poorest households, compared to 72 percent to the wealthiest households. The
poor receive a fair share of informal loans, however. In 1995, almost 17 percent of informal
loans (including loans from friends and relatives) was accrued to the poorest households
compared to 31 percent to the wealthiest households.  For example, as table 4 shows, households
with large operational holding (more than 25 acres), who are about 4 percent of landowners,
comprises 42 percent of households borrowing exclusively from formal sources.  In contrast,
households with no operational holding, who constitute 34 percent of the rural households,
constitute only 5 percent of borrowers from formal sources, while subsistence farmers,
comprising 35 percent of rural households, are only 18 percent of borrowers from formal
sources.
The skewed distribution of formal credit must have an impact on agricultural growth and
rural poverty in Pakistan.  If the impact of formal credit is higher for small holders than for large
holders, and large holders receive the lion's share of formal credit, one can hypothesize that the
skewed distribution of formal credit has a negative effect on rural growth and welfare. This is
indeed a concern, even when some 22 percent of rural borrowing comes from formal sources.
3.  Credit impact assessment: An Econometric Framework
What researchers observe is the amount of credit received from a source that is based on
both the demand for and the supply of credit.  The real difficulty is how to disentangle the
demand from the supply. Often household and area characteristics determine the household's
demand for credit.  But these same characteristics also influence the supply of credit, giving rise
to the problem of selection bias of who receives a loan. It is possible that borrowers are more
productive not because of the loan, but because they are more entrepreneurial, dedicated, and
hard-working. It is also possible that borrowers are productive and, hence, able to repay, not
because they have better ability but because they have a better productive environment.
Lenders screen borrowers based on their unobserved traits and environmental
characteristics which are not easily observed by researchers. Thus, the allocation of credit is not
7random.  2 As funds are fixed, the lenders would like to allocate funds to the best possible
borrowers and to the best possible agroclimate area.
A borrower's motivation and willingness to repay are some of the features a lender must
consider when lending. Informal lenders, because of their proximity and familiarity, tend to lend
to individuals with credit worthiness as well as involvement in productive activities that have
high potential. Formal lenders, while they are not part of the community, also use their own
subjective evaluation of the credit worthiness of a borrower by often judging by the level of
wealth a household possesses and other attributes. To obtain consistent estimates of the impact of
credit, we need to sort out the endogeneity of credit received by an individual from any source.
Consider the quasi-reduced form of an welfare equation,
(1)  Yik = CYk5 + XikP  + MikY + iNk
The left-hand side variable, Yyk, indicates the outcome of interest such as consumption of
household i of villagej  of district k, Cik  denotes household's receipt of formal credit, Alitk
reflects unobserved household characteristics like entrepreneurship and dedication that make the
loan amount endogenously determined, Xyk  denotes the observed household characteristics like
age, education, sex of head of the household and 4yk  is the error term.  If all variables are
observable, 3 would determine the impact of credit without bias.  However, since M,jk  is
unobservable, if the receipt of credit serves as an indicator of these unobserved variables, this
would result in biased estimates of the equation (1).
A common way out of this predicament is to first estimate the determinants of
borrowing and then use them to correct for selection bias in the second stage.  Consider
estimating first the following borrowing equation:
(2)  Cyk = X/k,B  + Zuku  + Mukyc + Eijk
The left-hand side variable of (2) denotes borrowing from formal sources, while the
right-hand side variables are the same as in the welfare equation, with superscripts differentiating
the coefficients. The Z variables are selected in such a way that they do not overlap with the
welfare equation, and serve as instrument variables.  Omitted variables in both equations-
12 See Pitt and Khandker  (1996)  for a discussion  of selection  biases.
8denoted by the M variables-would result in errors that would be correlated in both equations and
give rise to an endogeneity bias.
A possible way of resolving the endogeneity of credit is to find out if there is any
exogenous eligibility criteria used by a lender in selecting a borrower. Such an eligibility rule is
used by Pitt and Khandker (1998) to sort out the endogeneity of credit obtained from a micro-
credit program such as Grameen Bank.  They use a quasi-experimental survey design as an
identification strategy in a setting where eligible and non-eligible households based on
landholding were interviewed in both program and control areas.  Such an eligibility criteria-
based instrumentation is not appropriate for assessing the impacts of formal credit in Pakistan,
since the formal credit system ADBP has no exogenous loan eligibility criteria.
Finding convincing instruments, Zik  variables, therefore, is a critical part of this exercise.
According to demand theory, the price can be a good instrument for predicting the demand for a
good.  The price of formal finance is its interest rate, which hardly varies.  Hence, the interest
rate cannot be a good predictor of the demand for credit.  We propose a set of instruments based
on the fact that the loanable fund of the ADBP is fixed and that there is far more demand than the
ADBP can meet. Moreover, ADBP disburses much more than what they mobilize and often
funds come from the govermnment  and donors.  In this case, it is not the price of a loan but the
availability of the fund that matters most in determnining  how much a household can borrow from
ADBP. Given the available fund, borrowing of a household from ADBP would depend not only
on its own characteristics but also characteristics of its competitors.  The competitor's
characteristics are possible instruments in the borrowing equation.  The competitors can be at the
village level as well as at the district level where their characteristics would influence a particular
household's demand for credit without influencing its outcomes, such as consumption and
investment.
Thus, for the allocation of a scarce fixed fund, formal financial institutions such as the
ADBP would consider the characteristics of indicators, such as education and landownership of
borrowers.  13 Thus, while these measures of a borrower living in a district are important, similar
measures for other competing districts are also important in determining the fund allocation in a
13 The idea is, given a fixed  amount  of loanable  funds,  the more  credit  worthy  the household's  competitors
are,  the less  likely  the household  will be to get credit. For example,  if lenders  look  to the amount  of
landholding  in  deciding  whether  to give  loans,  a household  may  be less likely  to obtain  a loan if its
competitors  are on average  holding  more land. Even  if the village  competitors'  characteristics  may
not be good instruments  because  of "spillover"  or "social  capital"  arguments,  including  characteristics
of other  villages  in other  districts  are still  valid instruments,  as they are unlikely  to have any spillover
effect. In any case,  we will carry  out a specification  test to justify  whether  they  are valid instruments.
9particular district. So, for the district p among Np  districts, we calculate not only the averages of
household indicators for district p but also for all households in (Np  - 1) districts excluding
district p. For each village we calculate similar averages of household variables. These
competitors'  indicators are then the instruments for identifying how much a household can obtain
from a formal finance institution. The equation (2) can be written  as
(2 )  Cy]k  = XykI  +  Xjk  Or  + Xk-j  p +  Xk  a  + Xp-k  A + Mijky  + Ejk
where additional subscripts are introduced to indicate village (I) and district (k). For example, Cijk
represents credit of household i of villagej  of district k. In addition, the Z variable has been
replaced by X  variables, which are averages of household variable X computed at the following
levels: Xjk  at village level for villagej,  Xk.j  at district level for district k excluding villagej,
Xk  at district level for district k, and  Xp.k  for all districts of Pakistan excluding the clistrict  k.
Borrowing reflects three possible outcomes: (i) no borrowing for lack of access to
ADBP, (ii) no borrowing when households decide not to borrow, even if the ADBP is there, (iii)
a positive amount of borrowing, given that the household decides to borrow and the A1DBP
branch is available. The coefficient of credit measures the impact of one more rupee of
borrowing from a formal source, such as ADBP, on household outcomes such as consumption,
allowing the household to adjust its borrowing "portfolio" and all other behaviors, in response.
4.  Estimates  of credit impact
In order to distinguish the results based on two-stage method just discussed with those of
the case where credit from ADB is taken as given, we present both sets of results for outcomes of
particular interest. Data on borrowing from ADBP and other formal sources is given for each
household over the last five years since the data survey period.  The cumulative amount of
borrowing from formal sources over the five year period is the policy variable. A tobit model is
used to estimate the demand for borrowing from formal sources. 4 This would reflect the long-
term decision to borrow.
14 For many  households  the observed  amount  of credit  from either  source  may be zero. This  is why  the
observed  credit  is a truncated  variable,  and a Tobit  specification  is appropriate  for the cumulative
borrowing  equation.  Where  the dependent  variable  is binary  such as I or zero,  a probit or logit  rather
than  a linear  probability  model  is appropriate.  However,  since  we used  the predicted  value  in the
10For getting efficient estimates of credit effects, one would form three likelihood functions
with each possible credit outcome and estimate a joint log-likelihood function. This introduces
complicated estimation problems.  Instead, a two-stage procedure is used which yields consistent
estimates.
We use household observable characteristics including highest grades completed by a male
and a female, the total numbers of adult males and females in the household, sex and age of the
household head, and land owned by the household as independent variables.  Village
characteristics, including the prices of rice, wheat, gram, milk products, beef, fish, vegetables,
molasses and sugar, fruits, and maize, are also used to control for village effects in the
regression, which may reflect the "distance effect". The cumulative amount of credit taken by the
households from formal lenders, or the households' status of borrowing from formal sources over
the last five years prior to the survey, are used as a separate explanatory variable in the welfare
equation, although it is the dependent variable in the first stage regression.
The first stage tobit regression includes competitors' characteristics as instrumental
variables. Table 5 gives summary statistics of those variables excluding the village price
variables. Table 6 presents the tobit estimates of the borrowing equation (2'). The significance of
the education variables in the first stage tobit regression for formal loans indicates that policies
directed towards increasing the flow of information may improve access to fornal  credit.  Note
that households with educated members actually take more formal credit.  Similarly, households
with more land enjoy greater access to formal loans. But the education and landholding of the
competitors seem to reduce the amount of borrowing by the households.
We use the logarithmic specification for both the cumulative amount of credit and the other
outcome equations of interest. Tables 7 summarizes the effects of formal credit on selected
household welfare outcomes.  To compare results, we present both the OLS and two-stage. While
the two-stage results control for endogeneity of credit, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates
assume that credit is randomly given. To find out whether the 2SLS (where endogeneity is
controlled using the competitors'  characteristics as instruments) is more appropriate than the
OLS, we carried out the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test which basically calculates an F-
statistic for the residual term that is predicted from the first stage equation (2')  and then used as
an explanatory variable in the second stage equation (1)15.
second  stage  outcome  equation,  the linear  probability  model  still  produces  consistent  estimates  in the
second  stage  outcome  equation.
15  The second  stage  equation  uses both  the credit  variable  and predicted  residual  as explanatory  variables.
11The results are reported in table 8. They show that in four out of six outcomes there are
systematic differences between the two models. That means, in these cases, the OLS results
show that the atmount  of credit from formal sources cannot be taken as given, and it responds to
the same variables that affect the outcomes of interest.  Hence, the two-stage estimates are
preferred over the OLS estimates.
The two-stage estimates in table 7 reveal that formal credit has a positive impact on
household per capita consumption, for example.  Thus, a 10 percent increase in borrowing
increases consumption by 0.04 percent for formal loans.  Formal credit increases crop production
expenses of rural households.  One major purpose of credit is to support production costs such as
hiring labor or purchasing fertilizer and other inputs. A 10 percent increase in borrowing from a
formal source increases agricultural production cost by about 1 percent.
The effect of credit on the net value of agricultural production (i.e., gross value of
production less variable production cost) is positive and significant. A 10 percent increase in
borrowing from a formal source increases agricultural production by almost by 1 percent.
Formal credit has also a large and significantly positive impact on household non-land asset. A
10 percent increase in formal borrowing increases household non-land asset by as much as 0.4
percent.
Formal loans increase female labor supply, without any significant effect on male labor
supply. The elasticity of the response of female labor supply with respect to formal credit is
0.06, implying that a 10 percent increase in formal lending is associated with about 0.1 percent
increase in female labor supply.
Table 9 estimates the marginal returns to borrowing from the ADBP for different
outcomes of interest. The returns are estimated based on both the OLS (without correction for
endogeneity of farm credit obtained) and 2SLS (with correction for such endogeneity).  Results
indicate that the marginal return to household per capita consumption for borrowing from the
ADBP is 10 percent per year according to the OLS model compared to 6 percent when correction
was made.  Hence, returns to borrowing from a formal source are overestimated in the case of
consumption.  This is not the case, however, for all outcomes.  For example, while the marginal
return to farm net production is 59 percent according to a model that does not correct for
endogeneity, it is 69 percent when such a correction is made. That means, estimates can be lower
bound if the endogeneity is not corrected, as in the case of net value of farm production and
expenses.  The highest returns to borrowing is registered for the case of household non-land
asset, where the OLS model is more appropriate than the 2SLS model.  One 100 Rupee
12borrowing seems to generate a return of Rupees 152  worth of household non-land asset. This is
perhaps no wonder in a regime with high loan defaults where part of the unpaid loan money finds
its way to support borrowers' accumulation of non-land assets.
5. ADBP Cost of lending
How much does it cost to the ADBP to lend to the farming community in Pakistan? The
cost of lending by a formal lender such as the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan
(ADBP) is based on the cost of lending and interest income derived from lending.  Of course,
lending is one component of the bank business.  It also invests and undertakes other businesses.
The annual report provides a statement on income and expenditure of a bank's activities.
However, an annual report of a bank such as the ADBP does not reflect the true cost and income
of its activities.  It receives subsidized funds from the government and donors and the annual
report does not reflect the opportunity cost of such funds.  With appropriate cost of borrowing
and other sources of funds, one can then calculate the net profit a bank earns on its capital. In the
case of ADBP, we find that it is highly subsidized (PIDE 1998). The subsidized operation of the
ADBP is supported by the government and donors.  In such a case, a lender's  cost is estimated by
the net subsidy it receives.  Since an overwhelming portion of the formal loans comes from the
Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (ADBP), the net subsidy of ADBP can be used to
represent the costs of formal lenders.
The sources of subsidy of a program such as ADBP are interest-free grants and
concessionary funds.  The total subsidy is then defined as the difference between the market rate
of interest (which is the opportunity cost of the subsidized funds) times the total value of
subsidized fund.  As table 10 shows, the net subsidy of ADBP increased from 1,685 million
rupees in 1991 to 3,312 million rupees in 1995 (Qureshi and others 1999). This increment was
due to the increase of borrowing funds and equity, without any significant increase in the rate of
interest.  The average subsidy was 4.7 percent of the loans outstanding in 1991 and 7.5 percent in
1995.16  Thus, unlike informal lending, it is not cost-effective to lend by a formal lender such as
the ADBP.
16 The subsidy  of ADBP is not too much  when  compared  to that of other  successful  financial  institutions
around  the world.  For example,  Grameen  Bank  of Bangladesh,  which  is a role model  for micro-credit
programs  in  the World,  enjoyed  a subsidy  rate  of 5.6 percent  in 1994  (Khandker  1998).  But unlike
Grameen  Bank,  the loans  of ADBP  are received  largely  by large  landholders,  who  should  not receive
subsidized  credit.
13The nominal interest rate of ADBP for these loAns  rose very little from 1991 to 1995-
from 12.5 percent to 13.5percent. The rate of inflation during this period changed from 9.6
percent to 10.4 percent, although it went up to 13.9 percent in 1993. The data clearly shows that
the real rate of interest on an ADBP loan was negative for most of the time during the study
period.  So one way of reducing the subsidy dependence of ADBP is to increase the nominal
interest rate.  To know how much the nominal rate of interest should be increased to eliminate
subsidy, we can use the subsidy dependence index (SDI) measure (Yaron 1992). The SDI is
expressed by the net subsidy (total subsidy less accounting profit) as a percentage of interest
income received from on-lending (which is in turn defined as the average loan outstanding times
the nominal interest rate).  SDI measures the percentage increase in the average on-lending
interest rate required to eliminate all subsidies in a given year while keeping the return on equity
equal to the non-concession borrowing cost.  Between 1991 and 1995, the subsidy dependence
index increased from .38 to .56. That means, in order to reduce subsidy, the ADBP had to
increase the on-lending rate by 38 percent in 1991 and 56 percent in 1995. Using the nominal
rate for those years, it means, the nominal rate should have increased from 12.5 percent to 17.2
percent in 1991 and from 13.5 percent to 21 percent in 1995.
Another way of reducing subsidy dependence is to improve the loan recovery rate.  The
loan recovery has been a major concern for all government-run credit institutions in many
countries.  Pakistan is not an exception.  The loan recovery rate of ADBP was 59 percent in 1991
for all past loans and declined further to 45 percent in 1996 (table 11). The loan default cost was
as much as 60 percent for ADBP.  Most interestingly, as we found earlier, the bulk cf the ADBP
loans are received by large landowners, who do not need subsidized loans and are able to repay
the loan. Yet political factors played a heavy hand in the loan recovery position of the state-
controlled ADBP.
A final way of reducing subsidy dependence of the ADBP is to make it more dependent
on its own resources for lending and less on government and donors.  The bank must mobilize
savings to support its lending.  This savings-based lending practice would make it more
accountable for its loan disbursement, repayment and the cost of operation.  Over the years of
1991 to 1996, the ADBP's savings and deposits accounted for only 23 percent of its loan
disbursements, only 13 percent in 1994 and 45 percent in 1991 (Figure 1). The self-
sustainability of a bank must come from its increasing reliance on its own-managed resources.
146. Cost-effectiveness of the ADBP
We have discovered that the ADBP is not a cost-effective  delivery system, since it is
dependent  on  subsidy.  Despite  the  high  loan  default  costs  and  subsidy  dependence,  it  is
important to find out whether it is cost-effective socially to deliver targeted credit  through the
ADBP.  Since the delivery of farm credit embodies government policies,  it is worth exploring
whether it is cost-effective to deliver through the  ADBP. Alternatively, as the ADBP  loan is
highly politicized and loans are not repaid back (Qureshi, Nabi and Faruqee 1996), the question
worth exploring is who are the beneficiaries of its subsidized operation, and whether the society
benefits from such operation.
We measure the cost-effectiveness of the ADBP by the cost-benefit ratio.  Benefits are
measured by the impacts of credit on household consumption, where consumption measures the
extent of poverty.'7 We have taken consumption as a measure of rural welfare, because of wide
spread rural poverty in Pakistan.  We have two sets of benefits, one based on average benefits
accrued to an average household borrower, and the other is based on benefits accrued to different
groups of households calculated using the consumption effects of credit estimated for different
groups of households based on operational holdings. Like earlier impact estimates done based on
the entire sample of households, two-stage regressions were done for three categories of
households based on operational holding status: small holders (operational holding up to 12.5
acres), medium holders (operational holding between 12 to 25) and large holders (operational
holding more than 25 acres). 8 The revised benefit estimates indicate that benefits are substantial
and statistically significant only for small farmers and not other types of households.
The question to address is whether the ADBP loan is socially cost-effective.  As
indicated earlier, the program-level cost is measured by the net subsidy of a financial institution
such as the ADBP.  In 1995 the ADBP had a net subsidy of 3.312 million rupees and loans
outstanding of 44.160 million rupees.  The subsidy is the net cost to the society for supporting
the ADBP.  To determine the social benefits from the ADBP operation, we first calculate the
17 The impact  of credit on consumption  is taken  as a measure  of benefit  for calculating  cost-benefit  ratios.
Credit  is used for  production  and consumption.  The loan  used for consumption  increases  consumption
directly  by helping  consume  more  and indirectly  by increasing  labor  productivity  through  sustaining
the consumption  required  for maintaining  physical  strength  of a person. Credit  used for  production
increases  income  and net worth  which  in turn  help increase  the consumption.  Hence,  the consumption
impacts  measure  the appropriate  benefits  of credit,  which  is a short-term  welfare  indicator.
18 Thus,  small  holders  include  landless,  subsistence,  and small  farmers  together,  who represent  57 percent
of rural  households  but borrowed  about  44 percent  of formal  credit  (see table 4).
15average distribution of the loan outstanding (44,160 million rupees) among different landholding
groups. Assuming that the social distribution of ADBP loans is the same distribution as
witnessed from the weighted distribution of loans of our studied sample, we get the actual
amount borrowed by each group. This amount, when multiplied by the marginal return to
consumption, gives us an average amount of benefit for different categories of borrowers of
ADBP. 19  Aggregating benefits across groups, we get a program-level benefit of 1,640 million
rupees, leading to a cost-benefit ratio of 1.347 (=3,3 12/2,45  8) (table 12). That means, the social
cost of ADBP exceeded the accrued social benefit by as much as 35 percent in 1995. This is
very similar to the scenario where we used the aggregate welfare impact of the ADBP lending.
So the ADBP lending is not socially cost-effective. 20
Since the social benefit is positive only for small producers, the question is wlhether
ADBP lending can be cost-effective if all of it were disbursed only to the real beneficiaries,
meaning small holders in agriculture. The re-calculation of the social benefits and cost-benefit
ratio for the ADBP loans shows that benefits now exceed cost by 73 percent or the cost-benefit
ratio is 0.58.  Therefore, even if the ADBP is subsidized, a better targeting of its operation could
make the ADBP operation worth supporting by the society. Of course, it does not mean that the
ADBP must enjoy subsidy. It means that if subsidy were inevitable for running a highly targeted
scheme in rural areas, the generated benefits should be large enough so that the society finds it
worth supporting. It follows that the ADBP must be redesigned to reach the poor households and
small producers. If it cannot improve outreach, then its current subsidy dependence cannot be
justified, as its loans are largely benefiting the medium and large landlords, who do not qualify
for receiving subsidized credit.
7.  Conclusions with policy implications
The purpose of this study was to provide econometric evidence on the impact of farm
credit on household welfare and the role of the state-owned agricultural development bank in
Pakistan.  Like past studies, we find statistically significant effects of institutional credit not only
19 Using  marginal  rather  than average  returns  would  underestirnate  the benefits,  if average  returns  are
higher  than  marginal  returns. This  is a case  of diminishing  returns.
20 Note that  this is calculated  using  the estimates  of marginal  returns. Ideally  one should  use  the average
returns,  which  is higher,  under  the assumption  of diminishing  returns,  than marginal  returns. In this
case,  the calculated  benefits  are perhaps  an under-estimate.  If average  returns  are higher  than
marginal  returns,  it is possible  that  the ADBP  may  be cost-effective.  Nonetheless,  with  the same  type
of analysis,  the ADBP seems  less  cost-effective  than the Grameen  Bank  of Bangladesh,  which  is
highly  successful  in reaching  the poor households,  especially  women.
16on the determinants of agricultural output, but also on household consumption and other
household welfare indicators.  Like earlier studies, we find evidence of poor access of small
landowners to formal credit. Clearly, formal lenders are biased towards larger farmers who can
demonstrate collateral, and as a result the smaller and tenant farmers are left out. In Pakistan,
large landowners, who constitute only 4 percent of rural households, account for 42 percent of
formal finance, while subsistence and landless households, who constitute more than 69 percent
of rural households, receive only 23 percent of formal loans.
Formal loans are taken mostly for production purpose. Data shows that while only 5
percent of formal loans financed consumption, an overwhelming 95 percent went on to support
production (88 percent to farm and 7 percent to non-farm production).  In contrast, while 56
percent of informal loans meant for consumption, 44 percent went to support production.
These production loans are used for income generation, which would then support higher
consumption.  Thus, the effect of loans on consumption is indirect---loans support production
growth and higher income growth support higher consumption. If household consumption is
taken as a measure of household welfare, the estimated marginal impact of formal loans on
consumption is substantial.  An additional 100 rupees of loan from a formal source such as ADB
can increase as much as 6 rupee worth of per capita consumption. When impacts of credit are
estimated by operational landholding, it seems that the distribution of benefits vary by the size of
operational holding. In particular, the retums to consumption for borrowing from ADBP are as
much as 13 percent for small holders holding up to 2.5 acres of land compared to a small and
insignificant rate of 1-2 percent for medium and large farmers.
Is farm credit cost-effective for the ADBP to lend?  Using some estimates of the net cost
that is not recovered from its income, we find that the ADBP is subsidized, even more subsidized
than the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, a highly donor dependent and poor-focused micro-credit
program.  Using the subsidy of ADBP as the cost of delivering formal credit to rural
households, estimates show that the government of Pakistan has to provide a subsidy of as much
as 8 percent of its loan outstanding each year for supporting the ADBP operation; otherwise the
ADBP cannot run its business.  Reduction of subsidies must be done through cost savings such as
reducing loan default costs and by raising nominal interest rate that at least reflects a positive real
on-lending rate. It must also practice self-reliance by relying more on its mobilized deposits and
savings rather than government and donor resources for on-lending.
21 For a case  study  on Bangladesh's  Grameen  Bank,  see Khandker  (1998).
17More importantly, it is necessary to relax stringent collateral requirements and extend the
outreach so that formal lenders, such as ADBP, can reach the poor and the asset-less.  Results
suggest that institutional credit is productive, and that its outreach is limited to a small p:roportion
of the population that does not perhaps need subsidized credit.  Its outreach should be expanded
and collateral requirements relaxed so that credit has its desired impact, while steps to cut down
default rates should be taken at the same time.  There is little doubt that credit channeled in the
right direction can have significant anti-poverty effects, and that broadening the outreach of
formal lending institutions can be a step forward in the right direction.
18Table  1: Provincial  Distribution  of Households  by Loan  Categories
Province  Borrowing  Non-borrowing  Households  Households  Household
households  households  borrowing  from  borrowing  from  borrowing  from
formal sources  only  informal  sources  both formal and
only  informal sources
NWFP  295  128  7  270  18
Punjab  1,325  1,072  42  1,245  38
Sindh  697  273  24  649  24
Balochistan  201  157  13  180  8
AJ&K  63  169  3  57  3
Total  2,581  1,799  89  2,401  91
Table  2: Distribution  of loans by sources
Formal  sources  Percentage  Informal  sources  Percentage
Government  4.8  Friend/relative  57.2
ADBP  86.5  Commercial agent  4.9
Commercial Bank  3.2  Arthi  6.0
Cooperative  1.8  Input supplier  5.9
NGO  3.7  Shopkeeper  7.0
Landlord  12.8
Employer  1.9
BISI and others  4.3
Total amount of  10.90  Total amount of informal loans  38.85
formal loans (million  (million rupees)
rupees)
19Table 3: Distribution of different loans by purpose and duration (percent)
Purpose of borrowing  TermLs  of borrowing
Personal  Agricultural  Non-  Short  Medium  Long
agricultural
Number of formal loans  16.3  73.8  9.9  22.5  22.6  54.9
Number of informal loans  79.2  14.6  6.2  66.6  27.5  5.8
Number of all  loans  77.3  16.4  6.3  65.3  27.4  7.3
Amount of formal loans  5.2  87.5  7.3  8.1  15.2  76.7
Amount of informal loans  55.5  26.9  17.7  35.3  42.2  22.5
Amount of all loans  44.5  40.1  15.4  29.4  36.3  34.4
Note: 1.  Personal  purposes  are unproductive  like  consumption,  marriage  or death  in the family,  etc. Agricultural  purposes  include  purchase
of land,  machinery,  production  materials,  etc. Non-agricultural  purposes  include  investment  in non-farin  assets.
2. Short  term loans  are for  up to 6 months,  medium  term loans  are for  more  than 6 months  and up to I year,  and long  term loans  are
for more  than I year.
Table 4: Distribution of borrower households by operational holding
Borrower household category by operational holding
Landless  Subsistence  Small  Medium  Large
All households  34.2  35.2  18.3  8.2  4.1
Households borrowing exclusively  5.2  17.6  21.3  14.3  41.6
from formal sources
Households borrowing exclusively  24.6  30.8  19.9  15.3  9.4
from informal sources
Households borrowing from both  20.4  27.9  20.2  15.1  16.4
Formal and informal sources
Note: 1.  Operational  landholding  = Land  owned  + Land  rented  + Land  sharecropped-in  - Land  rented  out - Land  left uncultivated.
2. Household  category  by operational  holding  has been  defined  as: Landless  (no land),  subsistence  (0 acre>land<=5
acres),  small  (5 acres>  land<=12.5  acres),  medium  (12.5  acres  > land<=25  acres),  and large  (land>25  acres).
20Table 5: Weighted Means and Standard Deviations of dependent variables and selected
independent variables
Variables  Mean  Standard Deviation
Total formal loans of household (rupees)  1,981  18,765
Annual consumption of household (rupees)  27,060  18,241
Cost of annual crop production of household (rupees)  5,085  13,626
Value of net annual production of household (rupees)  16,377  39,479
Total investment of household (rupees)  5,099  19,531
Total non-land assets of household (rupees)  69,946  136,347
Labor of household males (hours/month)  223.8  188.4
Labor of household females (hours/month)  79.2  120.7
Highest grade completed by a male in household  5.73  4.71
Highest grade completed by a female in household  2.14  2.95
Land owned by household (acre)  14.04  87.79
Number of observations  4,380
21Table 6: First  stage  tobit estimates  ADBP  borrowing
Explanatory  variables  Coefficient
Max. male education in household (years)  1.331
(5.755)
Max. female education in household (years)  0.320
(1.097)
Land owned by household (acre)  0.029
(2.639)
Price of rice (Rs. Per kg)  -0.285
(-1.098)
Price of wheat (Rs. Per kg)  -0.570
(-1  .095)
Price of gram/pulses (Rs. Per kg)  0.103
(0.590)
Price of milk and milk products (Rs. Per kg)  -0.748
(-1.695)
Price of vegetable oil (Rs. Per kg)  -0.247
(-1.582)
Price of beef (Rs. Per kg)  0.173
(1.906)
Price of fish (Rs. Per kg)  -0.005
(-0.071)
22Table  6: First stage  tobit  estimates  ADBP  borrowing  (continued)
Explanatory  variables  Coefficient
Price of vegetables (Rs. Per kg)  0.093
(0.365)
Price of brown sugar (Rs. Per kg)  0.421
(1.828)
Price of fruits (Rs. Per kg)  -0.368
(-2.802)
Price of maize (Rs. Per kg)  0.138
(3.346)
Price of other grains and cereals (Rs. Per kg)  -0.010
(-0.307)
Mean of max. male education for other households of this community (years)  0.077
(0.046)
Mean of max. female education for other households of this community (years)  -4.268
(-2.630)
Mean of log of landholding for other households of this community  -8.617
(-1.421)
Mean of max. male education for all households of this community (years)  -0.118
(-0.060)
Mean of max. female education for all households of this community (years)  4.191
(2.948)
Mean of log of landholding for all households of this community  10.825
(1.596)
Mean of max. male education for all households in other communities of this district  0.423
(years)  (0.413)
Mean of max. female education for all households in other communities of this district  0.142
(years)  (0.087)
Mean of log of landholding for all households in other communities of this district  -2.144
(-0.751)
Mean of max. male education for all households in this district (years)  -0.833
(-0.564)
Mean of max. female education for all households in this district (years)  -0.118
(-0.055)
Mean of log of landholding for all households in this district  2.873
(0.551)
Mean of max. male education for all households in other districts (years)  3.033
(1.683)
Mean of max. female education for all households in other districts (years)  -3.220
(-1.727




Likelihood ratio (Chi squared 30)  211.70
Adjusted R squared  0.084
Number of observations  4,380
23Table 7: Impacts of ADBP borrowing
Household outcomes  OLS Model  2-s,tage  model'
Log of
Household annual consumption  (rupees)  0.007  0.004
(2.261)  (2.378)
Household annual crop production cost (rupees)  0.102  0.110
(3.388)  (6.855)
Household annual net production output (rupees)  0.072  0.083
(2.542)  (2.480)
Household non-land assets (rupees)  0.043  0.005
(3.193)  (0.667)
Household male labor supply  (hours/month)  0.012  0.004
(0.860)  (0.593)
Household female labor supply (hours/month)  0.064  0.098
(2.110)  (6.158)
'The first  stage  of 2-stage  model  consists  of a tobit regression  with  amount  of formal  lending  as dependent
variables.  t-statistics  of the second  stage  have  been corrected.
Notes:  t-statistics  in  parentheses.
All variables  reported  here are in logarithmic  form.
Regressions  also  included  following  explanatory  variables:  highest  grade attained  by any  male  and
that  by any female,  number  of adult  males  and  that of adult  females,  age of household  head  (years)
and  log of household's  land  asset.
Table 8: Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to determine whether 2-stage model is more
appropriate  (Ho: difference in coefficients is not systematic)
Household outcome  F  p>F
(1, 4359)
Household annual consumption  (rupees)  4.04  0.04
Household annual crop production cost (rupees)  45.86  0.00
Household annual net production output (rupees)  52.47  0.00
Household non-land assets (rupees)  0.00  0.99
Household male labor supply  (hours/month)  0.50  0.48
Household female labor supply  (hours/month)  41.23  0.00
Note: The  Durbin-Wu-Hausman  test  simply  tests  the residual  value  that  is  predicted  in  the  first  stage  regression
and  included  in  the  second  stage  regression.
24Table 9: Marginal return to ADBP borrowing (percent)
Household outcomes  OLS Model  2-stage tobit model
Household annual consumption (rupees)  9.56*  5.46*
Household annual crop production cost (rupees)  26.18*  28.23*
Household annual net production output (rupees)  59.52*  68.61  *
Household non-land assets (rupees)  151.83*  17.65
Household male labor supply  (hours/month)  0.001  0.001
Household female labor supply  (hours/month)  0.003*  0.004*
* t-statistics  are 10%  or better.
Table 10: Costs of lending for ADBP
Cost component  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
Funds borrowed at concessional rate (A)  32,376.88  35,952.24  42,309.78  43,880.11  48,003.75
(million rupees)
36-month interest rate (m) (percent)  10.5  11.99  11.57  11.71  11.77
Concessional rate (c) (percent)  6.21  6.70  5.71  6.20  6.04
Interest subsidy (IS= A*(m-c))  1,388.97  1,901.87  2,479.35  2,417.79  2,750.61
(million rupees)
Annual equity (E)  3,910.7  5,279.15  6,113.40  6,306.01  6,428.65
(million rupees)
Equity subsidy (ES=E*m)  410.63  632.97  707.32  738.43  756.65
(million rupees)
Reported annual profit(P)  114.85  152.41  189.25  192.61  195.30
(million rupees)
Net subsidy (NS=IS+ES-P)  1,684.75  2,382.43  2,997.42  2,963.61  3,311.96
(million rupees)
Annual average outstanding loan portfolio  35,582.17  37,312.35  38,791.60  40,215.77  44,160.31
(LP)
(million rupees)
Subsidy as a percentage of loan portfolio  4.73  6.39  7.73  7.37  7.50
On-lending interest rate (i)  (percent)  12.5  12.5  13.5  13.5  13.5
Inflation rate (percent)  9.6  10.0  13.9  13.6  10.4
SDI (NS/LP*i)  0.38  0.51  0.57  0.55  0.56
Required interest rate based on SDI  17.2  18.9  21.2  20.9  21.0
(percent)
Source:  PIDE (1998)
25Table 11: Recovery rates for ADBP loans
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Recovery rate of current dues  69.15  66.47  51.40  57.42  69.17  56.05
Recovery rate of all dues  59.29  54.77  62.35  53.85  52.30  44.68
Source:  PIDE (1998)
Table 12: Cost-effectiveness of ADBP lending  based on actual distribution of loans
ADBP  Borrower  Share of  Amount  Merginal  Gains  Benefit  Cost  Cost-
annual loan  type  loans  received  return  accrued  (Total of  (annual  benefit
out-  (mill. Rs)  (mill. Rs)  gains  subsidy)  ratio
standing  accrued)  (mill. Rs)
(mill. Rs)  (mill. Rs)
Small  0.420  18,547.2  0.130*  2,411.1
(1.00)  (44,160.3)  (5,740.8)
Medium  0.412  18,194.0  0.001  18.2  2,457.7  3,311.7  1.347
44,160.3  (0)  (0)  (0)  (5,740.8)  (0.577)
Large  0.168  14,189.3  0.002  28.4
(_)  (0)  (_)
Aggregate  1.00  44,160.3  0.055*  2,488.8  2,488.8  3,311.7  1.331
*Estimates  are significant  at 5% level
Note: Figures  in parentheses  are based  on the assumption  that  total lending  is disbursed  only  to borrowers  with positive  and
significant  returns  (that is, small  holders  in this case).
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27Appendix: Rural Financial Market Studies (RFMS) survey data description
The paper uses data from the Rural Financial Market Study (RFMS), conducted.  for the
State Bank of Pakistan with financial assistance from the World Bank in 1996. Household
survey and informal lenders'  survey data were collected by two organizations - the Applied
Economic Research Center (AERC) of the University of Karachi and the Punjab Economic
Research Institute (PERI) in Lahore. The Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE)
in Islamabad collected the institutional data on Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan
(ADBP) and commercial banks working in the rural sector. Household survey data was collected
for the all five provinces of Pakistan, namely North Western Frontier Province (NWFP), Sindh,
Balochistan, Punjab and Pakistan controlled Kashmir (AJ&K).  A rural household sample survey
was conducted on the pattern of the LSMS surveys conducted by the World Bank to provide the
data base. Various aspects of the household economy, including demographic information, labor
supply, household expenditure, income sources, farm production, borrowing practices, assets and
liabilities were covered.
A two-stage stratified sampling strategy was adopted for selection of villages and
households.  In the first stage, 250 villages were selected randomly from a total of approximately
50,000 villages in Pakistan (as reported in Agricultural Statistics 1994-5). The allocation of
villages within the provinces was done in proportion to cultivated area.  A completely
randomized sampling strategy was adopted for each provincial sample.  Villages were selected
randomly from the province after excluding very small and very large villages, depending on the
size distribution of villages within each province.
In the second stage, household information from each village was used to sample
households on the basis of landholding size and/or occupational distribution.  A census of
households was conducted in each of the selected 250 villages to gather information on
landholding size and occupational distribution.  To sample households within a village, a three-
stage procedure was adopted. First, the number of households selected from a village was in
proportion to the total household counts of villages.  Second, the households drawn from a
village were distributed in proportion to the distribution of landholding categories.  Finally, the
number of households to be interviewed were drawn randomly from the total number of
households in each category in each village.  In all, 6,000 household were covered frorm  the 250
selected villages, for an average of 24 households per village.  However, because of data
collection errors, we finally managed to use data of 4,380 households of 217 villages in this
paper. In order to reflect the actual distribution, we used sampling weights in both the
28descriptive and econometric analyses.  The provincial distribution of villages and households for
the original and reduced sample is shown in table 1.
Appendix table 1: Provincial Distribution of Villages and Households
Original sample  Revised sample
Province  Villages  Households  Villages  Households
NWFP  22  528  22  -423
Punjab  130  3,120  115  2,397
Sindh  67  1,602  52  970
Balochistan  20  486  17  358
AJ&K  11  264  11  232
Total  250  6,000  217  4,380
29Bibliography
Adams, Dale W. and Delbert A. Fitchett, eds. 1992. Informal Finance in Low-Income
Countries.  Boulder, Colo.:  Westview Press.
Aleem, Irfan. 1990. "Imperfect Information, Screening, and the Costs of Informal Lending: A
Study of a Rural Credit Market in Pakistan." World Bank Economic Review 4 (3):
329-49.
AERC (Applied Economics Research Centre) 1998. "Borrowers' Transaction Cost
Study.", Final Report:  Rural Financial market Study (Phase II), University of Karachi,
Karachi, Pakistan.
Binswanger, Hans P., and Shahidur R. Khandker. 1995. "The Impact of Formal Finance on the
Rural Economy of India." The Journal of Development Studies. Vol. 32, No. 2: 234-62.
Binswanger, Hans P., and Mark R. Rosenzweig. 1986. "The Behavioral and Material
Determinants of Production Relations in Agriculture." The Journal of Developrnent
Studies. Vol. 32 (October): 503-39.
Braverman, Avishay, and J. Luis Guasch. 1989. "Rural Credit in LDCs: Issues and Evidences."
Journal of Economic Development (Korea). Vol. 14 (June): 7-34.
Brugger,  Ernst  and  Sarath  Rajpatirana,  eds.  1995.  New  Perspectives  on  Financing  Small
Business in Developing Countries.  San Francisco: ICS Press.
Carter,  Michael R. and Keith D. Weibe. 1990.  "Access to Capital and its Impact on Agrarian
Structure and  Productivity in Kenya."  American Journal of Agricultural E'conomics.
Vol. 72: 1146-50.
Carter,  Michael R. 1988. "Equilibrium Credit Rationing of Small Farm Agriculture."  Journal of
Development Economics. Vol. 28: 83-103.
Christen, Robert Peck, Elizabeth Rhyne, and Robert Vogel. 1994.  "Maximizing the Outreach of
Microenterprise Finance: The Emerging Lessons of Successful Programs."  IMCC Paper,
Washington, DC.
Feder, Gershon, Lawrence J. Lau, Justin Y. Lin, and Xiaopeng Luo.  1990.  "The Relationship
between Credit and Productivity in Chinese Agriculture:  A Microeconomic Model of
Disequilibrium."  American Journal of Agricultural Economics. Vol. 72: 1153-57.
Ghate, Prabhu. 1992. Informnal  Finance:  Some Findings from Asia.  Oxford University Press.
Hoff, Karla and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1990. "Introduction:  Imperfect Information and Rural Credit
Markets: Puzzles and Policy Perspectives."  The World Bank Economic Review. Vol. 4,
No. 3: 235-51.
Hulme, David and Paul Mosley, eds. 1996. Finance Against Poverty.  London: Routledge.
30Zeller,  Manfred.  1993.  "Credit for the Rural Poor in Sub-Saharan Africa."  International Food
Policy Research Institute.  Washington, DC.
Zuberi, Habib. 1989. "Production Function, Institutional Credit and Agricultural Development in
Pakistan."  Pakistan Development Review. Vol. 28: 43-56.
32Policy Research  Working  Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2628  Monopoly  Power  and  Distribution  in  Hanan  G. Jacoby  June  2001  P. Kokila
Fragmented  Markets:  The  Case  of  Rinku  Murgai  33716
Groundwater  Saeed  Ur Rehman
WPS2629 Bridging  the Digital  Divide:  How  George  R. G. Clarke  July 2001  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Enterprise  Ownership  and Foreign  37644
Competition  Affect Internet  Access
in Eastern  Europe  and  Central  Asia
WPS2630  Parallel  Imports  of Pharmaceutical  Mattias  Ganslandt  July 2001  L.Tabada
Products  in the European  Union  36896
WPS2631  Pension  Reform  in Hungary:  Roberta  Rocha  July 2001  L. Gross
A Preliminary  Assessment  Dimitri  Vittas  37030
WPS2632  Human  Capital  and  Growth:  The  Sebastien  Dessus  July 2001  K. Mazo
Recovered  Role  of Education  Systems  39744
WPS2633  Bank Privatization  in Argentina:  George  R. G. Clarke  July 2001  P. Sintim-Aboagye
A Model  of Political  Constraints  and  Robert  Cull  37644
Differential  Outcomes
WPS2634  Chile's  Regional  Arrangements  and  Glenn  W.  Harrison  July 2001  L.  Tabada
the Free  Trade  Agreement  of  the  Thomas  F. Rutherford  36896
Americas:  The Importance  of Market  David  G.  Tarr
Access
WPS2635  Optimal  Use  of Carbon  Sequestration Franck  Lecocq  July 2001  V. Soukhanov
in a Global  Climate  Change  Strategy: Kenneth  Chomitz  35721
Is There  a Wooden  Bridge  to a Clean
Energy  Future?
WPS2636 Processes,  Information,  and  Javier  Campos-M6ndez  July 2001  G. Chenet-Smith
Accounting  Gaps  in the Regulation  Antonio  Estache  36370
of Argentina's  Private  Railways  Lourdes  Trujillo
WPS2637  Technical  Efficiency  Gains from  Antonio Estache  July 2001  G. Chenet-Smith
Port  Reform:  The Potential  for  Marianela  Gonzalez  36370
Yardstick  Competition  in Mexico  Lourdes  Trujillo
WPS2638  On Financing  Global  and International  Todd  Sandler  July 2001  S. Kpundeh
Public  Goods
WPS2639 Public  Policy  toward  Nongovernmental  William  Jack  July 2001  H. Sladovich
Organizations  in Developing  Countries  37698
WPS2640  Where  Has  All the Foreign  Investment  Harry  G. Broadman  July 2001  S. Craig
Gone  in Russia?  Francesca  Recanatini  33160Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2641 Is Russia  Restructuring?  New  Harry  G. Broadman  July 2001  S.  Craig
Evidence  on Job Creation  and  Francesca  Recanatini  33160
Destruction
WPS2642 Does  the Exchange  Rate  Regime  Ilker  Doma,  July 2001  A. Carcani
Affect Macroeconomic  Performance? Kyles Peters  30241
Evidence  from Transition  Economies Yevgeny Yuzefovich
WPS2643 Dollarization  and Semi-Dollarization  in  Paul  Beckerman  July 2001  P. Holt
Ecuador  37707
WPS2644 Local Institutions,  Poverty,  and  Christiaan  Grootaert  July 2001  G. Ochieng
Household  Welfare  in Bolivia  Deepa  Narayan  31123
WPS2645 Inequality  Convergence  Martin  Ravallion  July 2001  P. Sader
33902
WPS2646 Foreign  Direct  Investment  and  Bartlomiej  Kaminski  July 2001  L.  Tabada
Integration  into Global Production  Beata  K. Smarzynska  36896
and Distribution  Networks:  The  Case
of Poland
WPS2647  The Politics  of Monetary  Sector  Chibuike  U. Uche  July 2001  A. Al-Mashat
Cooperation  among  the Economic  36414
Community  of  West African  States
WPS2648  Methodologies  to Measure  the Gender  Elizabeth  Sharader  July 2001  M. Correia
Dimensions  of Crime  and  Violence  39394
WPS2649  The Impact  of the AIDS  Epidemic  on  Martha  Ainsworth  July 2001  H. Sladovich
the Health  of the Elderly  in Tanzania  Julia Dayton  37698
WPS2650  Sources  of China's  Economic  Growth, Yan  Wang  July 2001  A. Datoloum
1952-99:  Incorporating  Human  Capital Yudong  Yao  36334
Accumulation
WPS2651  China's  Growth  and Poverty  Shaohua  Chen  July 2001  A. Datoloum
Reduction:  Trends  between  1990  Yan  Wang  36334
and 1999
WPS2652 Demand  for World  Bank  Lending  Dilip  Ratha  July 2001  S. Crow
30763